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Abstract 
Expectations of migration and mobility steadily increasing in the longer term, which have a 
long currency in migration theory and related social science, are at odds with the latest US 
research showing a marked decline in internal migration rates. Given the similarity in 
demographic, economic and social trends between the USA and the UK, this paper reports 
the results of research that investigates whether the latter has been experienced any similar 
change in more recent decades. Using the Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study 
(ONS-LS) of linked census records, it examines the evidence provided by its 10-year 
migration indicator, with particular attention to a comparison of the first and latest decades 
available, 1971-1981 and 2001-2011. This suggests that, as in the USA, there has been a 
marked reduction in the level of shorter-distance (less than 10km) moving that has involved 
almost all types of people. In contrast to this and to US experience, however, the propensity 
of people to make longer-distance address changes between decennial censuses has declined 
much less, though the 2.6% fall between the 1970s and the 2000s may be an underestimate 
owing to the inclusion of moves to and from university in the latest decade. This finding is 
consistent with the results of a companion study which analysed data on migration between 
the health areas of England and Wales (Champion and Shuttleworth, 2015). There is 
therefore a strong case for now probing the causes of the sharp reduction in shorter-distance 
moving in Britain as well as the USA, as well as for investigating why the two countries 
differ in terms of their experience of longer-distance migration trends. 
Keywords: Internal migration, Migration intensity, Long-term trend, Longitudinal Study, 
England and Wales, Microdata  
JEL Classifications: J11, J61, O15, R23 
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Introduction 
The literature is full of mentions of an increasingly mobile world such as ‘all the 
world is on the move’ and ‘the age of migration’, as detailed below. Yet it is 
becoming clear that this is not true of all forms of mobility nor of all parts of the 
world. In particular, there is now irrefutable evidence that rates of local residential 
mobility and longer-distance migration have been falling in the USA not just as a 
result of the 2008-09 recession but over several decades. This observation has started 
to prompt research on the experience of other countries in order to see whether they 
too have witnessed a similar decline in migration intensities.  
Little work on trends in migration rates has been undertaken recently for the UK on a 
comprehensive and long-term basis. As noted below, both the companion study to this 
one (Champion and Shuttleworth, 2015) and a study by Lomax et al. (2014) are based 
on a data set that excludes the vast majority of shorter-distance moves, while also the 
latter study covers just the single decade 2001-2011. This paper reports the results of 
new research based on the Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study of 
England and Wales (ONS-LS), which identifies all inter-censal address changes made 
between 1971 and 2011 and then investigates whether there has been any significant 
change in the intensity of these events by distance of move. Its primary ingredients are 
the ‘10-year migration indicator’ for each of the four inter-censal periods from 1971-
1981 onwards and the calculated distance between addresses at the start and end of 
each period for each of those whom this indicator flags up. These allow the tracking 
of the rates of address changing both in aggregate and for a selection of population 
subgroups that can be defined consistently across the five censuses involved.  
The answer to the question in the paper’s title has substantial implications for both 
theoretical and applied arenas. As regards the former, if a decline in home moving has 
been taking place, it would to some extent challenge the prevailing notion of an ever 
more mobile society, though it could also be the case that home moving is being 
substituted by other forms of mobility, as predicted in one of the classic models of 
migration theory (see below). If no decline is evident, then the question alters to why 
the UK has not been following the path of the USA in the way that it has done in 
some other aspects of socio-demographic change. As regards policy, a change in 
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home-moving rates can have both positive and negative connotations, most notably 
for national prosperity which is normally seen to gain from labour mobility but also at 
the individual level where greater local rootedness is usually seen as beneficial unless 
it arises from people being unable to move when they want to. 
The rest of the paper is arranged in five sections. The first sets out the background to 
and the case for the present study. The next one justifies the choice of data source and 
approach, describing the key advantages as well as some limitations of the ONS-LS. 
Thirdly, the presentation of the descriptive results begins by looking at the overall 
proportion of people who were living at an address at the end of each inter-censal 
period that was different from that at the outset, both in aggregate and by distance-of-
move bands, and then goes on to examine the extent to which rates and trends varied 
between types of people. Next, modelling is used to determine the odds of moving 
associated with each characteristic allowing for the effect of all the others, before 
drawing the findings together in a concluding discussion.  
Background 
Much social theory assumes that migration and mobility will increase over the long 
term because of social and economic change. Common discourses point to 
‘modernity’, ‘dislocation’ and ‘hypermobility’ eroding attachment to place and, 
indeed, eroding the very concept of ‘place’ and substituting the themes of ‘flows’ and 
‘networks’. Theories of a ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman, 2000) are associated with post-
national ‘deterritorialisation’ processes and the end of states as containers for 
societies, helping us to understand why we now live in ‘the age of migration’ (Castles 
and Millar, 2009). Globalisation theory also identifies mobility, migration and related 
population flows as being central to the constitution of the global (Robins, 2000). 
Furthermore, occupational trends in western societies might be assumed to be raising 
migration rates because the composition of the labour market has been switching 
away from blue-collar manual work and becoming increasingly skewed towards 
higher-skilled ‘service class’ groups with a long tradition of greater geographical 
mobility (Green, 1992; Fielding, 2012). 
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These, and similar, ideas have a long currency in migration theory and related social 
science. Most notably, the notion of increasing population movement was highlighted 
by Lee (1966) in his refinement of Ravenstein’s nineteenth-century ‘laws of 
migration’: ‘Unless severe checks are imposed, both volume and rate of migration 
tend to increase with time’ (Lee, 1966, p.53). Zelinsky (1971) also drew on the idea in 
his ‘hypothesis of the mobility transition’, designed to sit alongside the demographic 
or, in his terminology, the ‘vital’ transition and its two components of the 
epidemiological and fertility transitions. His model delineates the shift from the 
situation of ‘little genuine residential migration’ characteristic of pre-modern 
traditional society through the early and late transitional phases to the advanced 
society. In the latter, ‘For the individual migrant, … one can postulate a lifetime cycle 
of residential shifts, along with an elaborate schedule of circulatory trips’ (Zelinsky, 
1971, pp. 245-246). This is ‘a state in which the term “sedentary” no longer seems 
apposite’ and people ‘frequently migrate in the sense of formal change of residence’, 
with an annual rate of 20 per cent being quoted for the US population then (p.247). 
Such ideas have underpinned the rise of the New Mobilities Paradigm. Cresswell 
(2006, p.15) notes the centrality of mobility within modernity, quoting from Florence 
Luscomb’s 1911 journal: the ‘modern individual is, above all else, a mobile being’. 
According to Sheller and Urry (2006, p.207), ‘All the world seems to be on the 
move’. In the words of Hannam et al. (2006, p.2), ‘The global order is increasingly 
criss-crossed by tourists, workers, terrorists, students, migrants, asylum-seekers, 
scientists/ scholars, family members, business people, soldiers, guest workers and so 
on. Such multiple and intersecting mobilities seem to produce a more “networked” 
patterning of economic and social life…’. As a result, ‘A “mobility turn” is spreading 
into and transforming the social sciences, not only placing new issues on the table, but 
also transcending disciplinary boundaries…. It seems that a new paradigm is being 
formed within the social sciences’. This is the justification that Hannam et al. (2006, 
pp. 1-2) used for the launch in 2006 of the journal Mobilities, designed to ‘address this 
emerging attention to many different kinds of mobilities, both by those engaged in 
practising and regulating diverse mobilities and by those involved in researching and 
understanding present-day and historical mobilities.’  
6 
Against this background, it is perhaps not so surprising that commentators seem to 
have found it difficult to acknowledge that migration rates are not continuing to 
increase in some parts of the world and accept that they have been undergoing a 
secular decline for some considerable time, most notably in the USA. A picture of 
rapidly declining migration rates in the USA was particularly strongly highlighted by 
Cooke’s (2011) analysis of the 1999-2009 change in inter-state and inter-county 
migration in Population Space and Place, with much emphasis then being put on the 
depressing effect of the Great Recession of 2008-09. When it was subsequently 
recognised that this decadal fall in rates had been exaggerated by time-series data 
inconsistencies relating to 1999-2005 (Cooke, 2013; Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wuhl, 
2012a), the main impact on the academic debate was to reinforce previous 
observations that US migration rates had peaked in the 1980s and that some signs of a 
long-term downturn could be traced back another quarter of a century. In particular, 
Long (1988) and Gober (1993) both identified an almost uniformly downward trend 
on overall residential mobility dating back to the early 1950s. Fischer (2002) even 
traces the phenomenon back into the nineteenth century, concluding that ‘Americans 
today move less often that did their ancestors’ (p. 193) and prompting his paper title 
‘Ever-more rooted Americans’. Small wonder, therefore, that there was more than a 
hint of frustration in Wolf and Longino’s 2005 paper ‘Our “increasingly mobile 
society”? The curious persistence of a false belief’!  
A decade on from Wolf and Longino’s (2005) lament, however, it is difficult to 
believe that anyone could still be labouring under this misapprehension, even if the 
researchers and commentators are primarily drawn from and live among those groups 
for whom hyper-mobility remains the norm for their work and careers. The statistical 
record of declining residential mobility and migration rates in the USA has been set 
out in a succession of reports on geographical mobility by the US Census Bureau, 
culminating in its 2011 edition which announced the lowest ever 5-year mover rate 
recorded by the Current Population Survey since its inception in 1948 (USBC, 2011). 
The one-year change of address data from the CPS indicates that the USA’s overall 
mobility rate remained rather consistently around 20% for the first two decades after 
the Second World War before falling gently over the next decade and a half through 
the two recessions of the 1970s. There was some recovery in rate in the mid 1980s, 
but this was only temporary and was then followed by a much steeper and more 
7 
sustained decline, with – impressively – the rate of fall hardly accelerating during the 
Great Recession. 
This message of declining rates in the USA has now been relayed widely by media 
reports (e.g. Jaffe, 2012; Lowery, 2013) as well as a number of recent academic 
papers including Cooke (2011, 2013), Frey (2009), Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wuhl 
(2012a, 2012b), Molloy et al. (2011, 2013) and Partridge et al. (2012). Moreover, 
these studies make it clear that decline in migration rates has been occurring at all 
spatial scales: it has been just as strong for inter-state migration as it has been for 
between-county within-state moves and within-county address changes.   
The sharp decline in US internal migration rates since the mid 1980s prompts the 
question as to whether any other countries have experienced any similar reduction 
over the past 30 years. Bell and Charles-Edwards (2013) found declining migration 
intensities for three of the other five more developed countries for which they had 
obtained five-year migration data from the 1990 and 2000 census rounds, these being 
Australia, Canada and Switzerland, with the exceptions being Greece and Portugal. 
The latest research on the UK (Lomax et al., 2014; Champion and Shuttleworth, 
2015) suggests that, while migration rates dropped during the 2008-09 recession, there 
has been no long-term reduction on anything like the scale observed for the USA. 
These two studies, however, are based on data sets that record only between-area 
migration and omit the vast majority of short-distance moves, so there remains the 
need for a comprehensive analysis that covers all distances of address changing.  
The study: aim, data and approach 
Against this background, the primary purpose of this paper is to see whether the 
intensity of internal migration in England and Wales has been falling in the longer 
term in the same way as has been observed for the USA. Following on from this, the 
aim is to probe the direct explanations for any such change in terms of how home 
moving rates vary between population subgroups. These two research questions 
require a dataset on address changing that (1) covers all distances of move; (2) spans 
as long a time period as possible; and (3) contains a range of personal characteristics 
defined on a consistent basis for this period of time. This section sets out the reasons 
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for choosing the ONS-LS for this study and details its relevant features, including 
certain limitations that need to be borne in mind when interpreting the results.  
The selection of the ONS-LS for this study involved a number of stages. Official 
surveys were ruled out at an early stage, primarily because of sample size, even more 
so the panel and cohort data sets. The National Health Service Central Register 
(NHSCR) and the Population Census are the sources that have most commonly been 
used for monitoring migration trends and patterns since the 1960s (see, for instance, 
the essays in Stillwell et al., 1992), but both were found to suffer certain weaknesses 
for present purposes. As documented by Champion and Shuttleworth (2015), the 
NHSCR can be used to track migration annually from 1971, but it covers only 
between-area moves and differentiates people by only age and gender. Meanwhile, the 
Census collects a wealth of information on people’s characteristics including (from 
1961) usual address 12 months earlier, with the latter covering all moves irrespective 
of distance. These enumerations, however, take place only once a decade (apart from 
the 10% Census of 1966), with the difference between each year’s rate being 
determined very largely by timing in relation to the business cycle, thus not permitting 
any long-term trend to be identified robustly (Champion and Shuttleworth, 2015).  
By comparison with these various sources, the migration data in the ONS-LS was 
found to be much superior in terms of the criteria set out above. The ONS-LS contains 
the complete census records of a sample of just over one per cent of the population of 
England and Wales, starting with the 1971 Census and now incorporating the 2011 
Census, with individuals linked between Censuses on an anonymised basis. In 
addition to the information derived from the one-year change of address question 
from each of the five Censuses, it includes a variable derived from the usual address 
of each sample member for which this information is available at each pairing of 
adjacent censuses, known as the ‘10-year migration indicator’ and in theory covering 
all distances of move (see below). Moreover, there is a variable giving the straightline 
distance between each person’s addresses at the start and end of each of these four 
inter-censal decades, where these are different. At the outset this was not available for 
1971-1981, but this omission was subsequently rectified (see Acknowledgements). As 
pointed out by Niedomsyl and Fransson (2014), this precise measure of migration 
distance is greatly preferable to one based on whether or not a move involves crossing 
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an administrative boundary, given that boundary crossings include a proportion of 
shorter-distance moves as well as longer-distance ones. This also gives us the 
opportunity of comparing trends over time for a range of distances of move, which are 
recognised to differ in terms of their nature and motivation (Gordon, 1982). 
At the same time, it is important to be aware of some limitations in the ONS-LS data. 
Firstly, while linkage rates are high (see Lynch et al, 2015), the tracing of ONS-LS 
members between censuses cannot be perfect. Obviously, there can be a valid reason 
why someone can appear in one census but not the next or vice versa, these being 
primarily due to births, deaths and migration in and out of the country during the 
period. For others, though, this may arise from a person being missed off the census 
return or through different information on name or date of birth being given at the two 
censuses.  
Secondly, the range and specific nature of questions asked by the census has altered 
over time, as some issues rise in salience while others become less important, with the 
result that it is not possible to get the full benefit of the wealth of information on 
personal characteristics. Two questions which today are accorded great prominence 
are ethnicity and health status, but these were first asked only in 1991 and so cannot 
be included in any systematic analysis that spans the full 1971-2011 period. 
Additionally, for some questions that have been asked by all the relevant censuses, 
there have been changes in the form of the question and/or in the type of answers and 
the way that they have been categorised in the released variable. For these, it is 
necessary to combine the detailed responses into a set of broader categories that are 
consistent across the censuses.  
A more intractable issue is posed by the change in definition of usual residence for 
students living away from their home during term time, in that for the first time in 
2001 this was defined as the term-time rather than the vacation address. It is also the 
case that there are differences between censuses in the precision with which people’s 
usual address was coded, meaning that there is likely to be slight variation between 
periods in the coverage of the most localised moves. According to ONS Geography 
Division (2015), the method was least precise for 1981-1991 (when differences of 
under 500 metres between the Enumeration District centroids were treated as non-
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moves), while it was most accurate for 1971-1981 (when actual addresses were 
compared manually) and for 2001-2011 (when addresses were coded to the nearest 1 
meter and 0.1 meter at these two censuses respectively) (see also Gleave, 1995; 
CeLSIUS, 2015). The approach adopted here is to be vigilant in interpreting the 
findings and, in particular, give less weight to the results for 1981-1991 and focus 
more on the longer-term changes between 1971-1981 and 2001-2011, while 
recognising that for the latter period the migration rates are likely somewhat inflated 
by including some moves of students from and to term-time addresses. 
Lastly, two minor drawbacks of the ‘10-year migration’ approach should be noted. 
One is that the time between adjacent censuses is never 10 years to the precise day. 
While the census has always been held in the spring before local government elections 
in early May, its precise timing has varied somewhat, mainly to avoid the Easter 
weekend which is dictated by the lunar cycle. As the maximum discrepancy is only 
around 1% of the decade, it is conventionally ignored in census-based comparisons of 
population change between ‘decades’, and so too it is here. Secondly, the approach 
picks up only one move per person in an inter-censal period, so it cannot identify any 
additional address changes that might have occurred, and in a similar vein, it will treat 
someone who has moved away from and back to the same address as a non-mover. 
But these features are also characteristic of studies of the one-year change of address 
data from censuses and other sources. While multiple address changing by individuals 
is going to be more prevalent over 10 years than one, the assumption here is that any 
change in the extent of multiple address changing across the decades will be highly 
correlated with any change in the 10-year migration rate.  
In sum, there is no data set that is ideal for this study and so we opt for the best one 
available. The ONS-LS dataset provides a four-decade time span back to the early 
1970s. It contains a ‘10-year migration indicator’ and precise distances between its 
members’ addresses at the beginning and end of each inter-censal period, together 
with information on a range of personal characteristics that are known to be associated 
with the likelihood and distance of moving home. In now proceeding to use the ONS-
LS to see whether or not the internal migration rate for England and Wales has 
declined in the longer term, it is merely necessary to ensure that any such observed 
tendency is not likely to have arisen through statistical artefact.  
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The extent of and trend in 10-year address changing rates 
This section begins by looking at the overall proportion of people who were living at 
an address at the end of each inter-censal period that was different from that at the 
outset and compare this across the four decades. These are then disaggregated by 
distance in order to discover whether any change was distributed evenly across all the 
lengths of move or was more common among longer- or shorter-distance moves. 
In the first study period 1971-1981, the number of people who were recorded as usual 
residents of England and Wales in both censuses and whose birthday fell on one of the 
four dates eligible for ONS-LS membership was 397,258. Of these, 178,807 were 
deemed to be living at the same address in 1981 as in 1971, while those with a 10-
year migration flag numbered 218,451, thus comprising 55.0% of the total. This might 
seem a surprisingly low level to those familiar with the level of around 1 in 10 people 
moving in England and Wales in an average pre-census year, but it is a well-
established observation, dating back at least to Long (1991) and confirmed most 
recently by Bell at al (2015), that the rate of address changing over longer periods is 
not a simple multiple of the one-year rate. In countries where the census asks people’s 
addresses both one year and five years ago, the latter rate is only about three times the 
former, this being because there is a significant minority of people who make more 
than one move over five years but will be recorded as making just a single address 
change in the 5-year data. This effect can be expected to be more pronounced in 10-
year address change data, as is the case here. 
How has the rate of address changing altered over the three decades since the 1970s 
according to the ONS-LS? On the one hand, the total number in the equivalent cohorts 
has risen progressively to 404,947 for 1981-1991, to 409,421 for 1991-2001 and then 
to 419,431 for 2001-2011, as would be expected as the country’s population has 
grown. By contrast, the number of 10-year address changers has declined 
progressively from its 1970s volume of 218,451 to 214,622, 203,724 and 189,820 for 
these next three decades respectively. As a result, the 10-year migration rate fell 
steadily across the four decades, reducing from its 55% level for the 1970s to 53.0% 
for the 1980s, 49.8% for the 1990s and 45.3% for the 2000s, an overall fall of 9.7 % 
points between the first and last decades and a relative decline of 17.7% from the 
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1970s rate. Clearly, in answer to the primary question posed for this study, according 
to this measure of migration intensity, the population of England and Wales would 
appear to have been moving home substantially less in recent years than was the case 
three decades ago. At the very least, even if more recently a minority may be moving 
home even more frequently within the 10-year period (see above), an increasing 
proportion has been staying put. 
The first step in understanding why the 10-year address changing rate has been falling 
is to disaggregate the overall rate by the distance between people’s addresses at the 
start and end of the decades. Figure 1 displays the rates for four distance bands. It is 
immediately apparent that the fall in overall rate is almost entirely the result of 
reduced short-distance moving, with the proportion changing address by less than 
10km dropping by 9.4 % points from 36.9% to 27.5%, a relative decline of almost a 
quarter (24.5%). By contrast, the rates for the three longer-distance bands altered only 
marginally, with the 2001-2011 rate for 200km+ moves lower than that of 1971-1981 
by just 0.2 points, that for 10-<50km down by 0.1 and that for 50-<200km unchanged. 
Figure 1. Proportion of the starting populations with a different address at the end of 
the decade from that at the start by distance of move (Source: calculated from ONS-
LS. Crown copyright) 
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This finding is significant for at least two reasons. In the first place, the main change 
appears to have taken place in the types of moves that are largely missed by the 
primary continuous migration recording systems that are based on health records, 
such as that used by Champion and Shuttleworth (2015). As mentioned above, the 
latter have only ever counted between-area moves, where the areas are no smaller 
than the local and unitary authorities and, for most of the period since the 1970s and 
for most of the country, were the larger county-level units. This would explain why 
these recording systems suggest very little, if any, reduction in migration rate over 
time, aside from the short-term fluctuations related to economic cycles. Secondly, the 
evidence of Figure 1 suggests that the sharp reduction in migration rate associated 
with the deep recession of 2008-09 observed by Lomax et al (2014) has not 
significantly reduced the scale of longer-distance migration in the longer-term picture, 
perhaps not surprisingly given that each of the previous three decades also 
experienced a mixture of boom and bust conditions.  
How much confidence can be placed in these findings, given the two main 
uncertainties over the data mentioned above? As regards the possibility of the 
shortest-distance address changing being undercounted in 1981-1991, the only effect 
of this would be to raise the proportion moving less than 10km somewhat beyond the 
calculated rate of 34.7%, which would also increase the overall migration rate. This 
would make the profile for 1981-1991 look more like that of the previous decade, but 
it would not alter the general conclusion that 10-year address changing has generally 
been declining during our study period, only that perhaps it started somewhat later 
than suggested by Figure 1. The corollary of this would be that the rate actually fell 
faster, once it had got underway.  
The other main source of concern about the data – that relating to the change in the 
definition of usual address for students – could also be deemed to accentuate rather 
than undermine the main finding of address changing rates falling over time. The 
inclusion of moves to university in 1991-2001 will have artificially swelled the 
overall rate for that decade somewhat, with the inclusion of moves both to and from 
university in 2001-2011 doing this even more for that decade. If the address changing 
of these two decades could have been put on the same basis as for the first two, then 
the decrease in rate across the study period would likely have been even more marked. 
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The only rider to this is that, as such education-driven migration is normally longer 
distance, that step would have its main effect there, meaning that the rate of moves of 
50km and over might not have held up quite as well as shown in Figure 1. 
Nevertheless, these student moves will form a relatively small part of the wider 
picture, because they relate only to those attending university at the time of the 
censuses: the data will miss those who moved both to and from university within the 
course of an inter-censal decade.  
There is therefore no question that 10-year address-changing has decreased over 
recent decades nor that this is primarily due to shorter-distance moving. The only 
uncertainty is whether the decline started after the 1970s or the 1980s. In now going 
on to examine the trend in greater detail, our approach is to focus primarily on how 
much different the pattern for 2001-2011 is from that of our first decade 1971-1981, 
for which we have the greater confidence in the quality of the short-distance moving 
data, but caution still needs to be exercised over the possible swelling of the longer-
distance rates for 2001-2011 arising from the student issue. 
Variation in 10-year address changing between people 
This section of the paper has two principal objectives. The first is to become more 
familiar with the nature of 10-year address changing, as this measure is not commonly 
used in migration studies, as mentioned above. In particular, are the types of people 
who do or do not stay put over a decade-long period the same ones that are less or 
more residentially mobile according to sources that monitor continuously or provide 
data on one-year change of address? Secondly and more importantly, the aim is to 
discover which types of people are the ones most involved in the observed decline in 
10-year address changing since the 1970s. In particular, which have seen their 
propensity to make a move of less than 10km drop the most by 2001-2011? But also, 
in relation to the apparent stability in rates of longer-distance moving, is it the case 
that no types of people have experienced a significant change in this between the 
1970s and the 2000s, or does the overall pattern of little change arise from the effect 
of falling rates for some groups of people being offset by an increase in rates for 
others? All the relevant data for answering these questions are listed in Table A1 (see 
annex).  
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Which people are most and least migratory over a 10-year period? 
This question is tackled using the address changing rates for our first decade 1971-
1981. A wealth of previous studies gives a very clear idea of what to expect. Probably 
the most comprehensive is that of Owen and Green (1992), who drew on a variety of 
sources on one-year or continuous address changing including the 1981 Census, the 
Labour Force Survey and Building Society data to portray differentials in migration 
propensities for the 1980s. They found virtually no difference in rate between males 
and females, but considerable differences by age (with the 16-34s being most mobile), 
by occupation (highest for managerial and professional, plus those in personal and 
protective services), by highest qualification (highest for those with degrees and A 
Levels) and by housing tenure (much the highest for the private-rented sector). How 
does this profile of migration intensity compare with that for 10-year address 
changing?  
To answer this question, the left-hand panel of Table 1 lists in rank order the 15 types 
of people with the highest rate of address changing over any distance for 1971-1981 
out of the full list of types analysed for this study (see Table A1 in the annex). The 
characteristic refers to status at the start of the period, i.e. 1971, and the importance of 
age is immediately apparent. All age groups from 10 to 29 (becoming 20-39 by the 
end of the period) are included, along with 0-4s that will no doubt be members of 
families headed by many of the former. Younger age will also be instrumental in the 
appearance here in the list of ‘student’ (these defined here as aged 15 and over and 
still in education), singles (mainly children and young adults in an era when early 
marriage was the norm) and private renting (mainly younger people saving up for a 
mortgage or on a council housing waiting list), as well as younger adults probably 
making up a fair proportion of the unemployed. Members of the armed forces 
(included in Owen and Green’s ‘personal and protective services’) have the highest 
rate of all, not surprising given their enforced relocations between defence 
establishments and their departure from these when returning to civilian life. The most 
highly educated and those in professional and skilled white-collar jobs also parallel 
those identified as most likely to be one-year migrants by Owen and Green, along 
with people born outside the UK. The other end of the spectrum (not shown in Table 
1, but see Table A1) is dominated by the older age groups (the lowest being the 45-
49s at just 36%, markedly below the overall rate of 55%) and related types such as the 
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retired and widowed, along with part-time employees (these most commonly being 
married women at this time).  
Table 1. The 15 types with the highest rate of 10-year address-change 1971-1981, by 
distance of move 
Rank All distances of move Less than 10km 50km and over 
Type % Type % Type % 
1 Armed forces 88.2 15-19 53.7 Armed forces 60.1 
2 Student aged 15+ 87.6 20-24 51.4 Student aged 15+ 33.0 
3 15-19 87.3 Private renter 45.6 Degree 19.0 
4 20-24 84.3 10-14 44.7 Professional 16.6 
5 Private renter 71.5 25-29 43.3 15-19 16.4 
6 25-29 70.3 Divorced 43.2 20-24 15.3 
7 10-14 68.0 Single 42.7 Intermediate 13.9 
8 Single 65.6 Unemployed 42.4 Private renter 13.7 
9 Divorced 63.1 0-4 42.3 25-29 13.1 
10 Unemployed 62.6 Social renter 41.6 10-14 12.2 
11 0-4 62.3 Non UK Born 41.0 Single 11.6 
12 Non UK born 61.2 Unskilled 40.1 Skilled non-manual 11.1 
13 Skilled non-manual 58.7 30-34 38.2 85+ 11.0 
14 Degree 58.5 Skilled manual 38.1 Non UK born 11.0 
15 Professional 58.2 Partly skilled 37.2 Owner occupier 10.6 
Note: Degree includes other tertiary qualifications. Intermediate refers to Social Class II. 
Source: Table A1 in Annex. 
Table 1 also lists the types of people with the highest propensity to make the shortest 
and longest moves over the decade. As is recognised in the literature on the motives 
for moving differing by distance or, more usually, by whether a migrant crossed a 
regional boundary or not), the more skilled and educated appear high up in the 50km+ 
list but not in the <10km one, and vice versa for the less skilled, while military 
personnel are especially highly mobile over long distance as expected. Higher rates of 
local-scale turnover are also characteristic of social renters and more vulnerable 
people such as the divorced and unemployed. Younger age groups and associated 
types like singles and private renters, however, feature strongly among both distances 
of address changing. Again, these patterns of differentiation accord strongly with what 
is known about variations in migration rates measured over periods much shorter than 
a decade, suggesting that any findings from the ONS-LS about which types of people 
have seen the greatest decreases in 10-year address changing would very likely also 
be exhibited by a continuous sequence of data on one-year address changing if such a 
source covering more than just gender and age had been available for this study. 
17 
For which people has the 10-year address-changing rate declined most? 
This question is answered by calculating the percentage change in address-changing 
rate between 1971-1981 and 2001-2011, with people classified on the basis of their 
status at the start of the each of the two decades respectively. Table 2 ranks the 15 
population types of Table A1 (see annex) in order of greatest decline for each of three 
distances of move.  
Table 2. The 15 types with the greatest relative decrease in their 10-year address-
change rate between 1971-1981 and 2001-2011, by distance of move 
Rank All distances Less than 10km 50km and over 
Type % Type % Type % 
1 Retired -44.7 65-69 -53.6 Degree -33.6 
2 65-69 -44.6 Retired -53.0 85+ -31.7 
3 70-74 -43.5 70-74 -50.7 0-4 -29.9 
4 60-64 -40.0 60-64 -47.2 60-64 -29.6 
5 75-79 -37.8 55-59 -43.7 Intermediate -28.8 
6 Widowed -34.7 Widowed -43.2 70-74 -27.5 
7 55-59 -33.0 75-79 -42.0 Divorced -27.4 
8 Non UK born -31.4 80-84 -39.3 Armed forces -26.2 
9 Divorced -31.1 50-54 -38.4 Married -25.4 
10 Married -30.7 Non UK born -36.5 65-69 -25.3 
11 80-84 -29.6 Divorced -36.0 Retired -24.8 
12 Sick -27.4 Unskilled -35.9 Professional -23.6 
13 Unskilled -25.8 Married -35.3 Non UK born -22.6 
14 50-54 -25.7 Sick -32.3 Employed part-time -21.3 
15 Self-employed -23.9 45-49 -30.2 Owner occupier -21.1 
Note: Degree includes other tertiary qualifications. Intermediate refers to Social Class II. 
Source: Table A1 in Annex. 
Looking first at all distances of move (left-hand panel of Table 2), it is evident that 
older age is a key driver of declining rates: not only did the older age groups generally 
have the lowest rate at the outset in the 1970s (see Table 1 above), but they have 
experienced the largest relative decline in rate since then, getting on for a halving of 
rate for those aged 65-69 (becoming 75-79 by the end of the decade). The appearance 
of the retired and widowed in this list merely confirms the importance of age. Self 
employment also tends to be more common in the older working-age population. 
There is also probably an age element in presence of ‘sick’ (i.e. economically inactive 
because of permanent illness) in the list, so too that of the divorced and married, 
reinforced by the trend towards delayed marriage which will have shifted the 
composition of these groups towards the less migratory ages. The latter factor may 
also have helped to put the non-UK-born into this list, as the rate of immigration 
slowed between the 1970s and 1990s and the non-native population thus aged. (In the 
next section we will use modelling to separate out the effect of age.)     
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The picture is very similar for the change in the rate of moving less than 10km 
(middle panel of Table 2), not surprisingly given the high, albeit sharply declining, 
importance of shorter-distance moving already seen in Figure 1. Older age is even 
more emphatically the main driver here, with the 10-year address-changing rate more 
than halving for the 65-74s between the 1970s and the 2000s. The pattern is, however, 
somewhat different for longer-distance migration (see the right-hand panel). Older age 
still features quite strongly in this, but the greatest relative contraction in the 
proportion of people moving 50km or more between censuses is for those holding a 
degree or equivalent tertiary qualification, down by fully one-third in marked contrast 
to the overall decline of just 2.6%. This may well be linked to the reduction in long-
distance moving by the top two occupational skill groups of professional and 
intermediate non-manual workers, with rates down by over a quarter, and also 
possibly to the appearance in the list of owner-occupiers, down by one-fifth.  
To get a better handle on what is behind these declining rates, it is helpful to contrast 
the types of people involved with those that have experienced least reduction in 10-
year address changing over the study period (not shown here, but see Table A1 in the 
annex). In fact, for all distances of move, there are two cases where the rate has 
actually risen against the overall trend, namely private renters (up by 7%) and 25-29 
year olds (up by 2%). Next, in terms of the smallest falls in rate, are the 30-34s and 
35-39s, confirming that there is no artificial ‘student issue’ factor behind these. As 
regards the shortest-distance moves (under 10km), again there are two types where the 
rate actually rose between the 1970s and the 2000s, but this time featuring members 
of the armed forces (with a 4% increase) as well as 25-29 year olds again just a 1% 
increase). As for all address changing, the smallest reductions in rate are for the next 
older groups spanning 30-39, their putative children (0-4s), private renters and 
‘students’ (this type being restricted to those beyond compulsory-schooling age who 
are economically inactive).  
For longer-distance moving, the pattern is considerably different, as would be 
expected from the earlier observation that at least some types have experienced a 
marked reduction in rate despite the very small reduction in overall rate. In all, 13 of 
the types shown in Table A1 display a higher rate of 50km+ moving for the 2000s 
than the 1970s. Indeed, 8 of them post increases of at least 10%, but several of these 
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types – those starting the decade as 5-9s, 10-14s, 15-19s, 20-24s, singles and private 
renters – are likely to be partly driven by the ‘student issue’. The other types, 
however, are unlikely to be affected by this artificial swelling of rates, namely 
unskilled or partly skilled workers (both with increases of over 25%) and also skilled 
manual workers and those renting from a social landlord (with increases of 7% and 
9% respectively).  
From the findings so far, it is apparent that age is the single most important 
discriminator in trends in the all-moves rate as well as linking through to several other 
features there, so a closer look is now taken at this, drawing on data for all four 
decades. Figure 2 confirms that the reductions in 10-year migration rate have been 
much greater for some age groups than others, with the steepest falls being for those 
aged 50 and over at the start of the decade. Going further, it also reveals a fairly 
consistent progression across the four decades, though there is no major difference 
between the 1970s and the 1980s and indeed the rate for the oldest age groups is 
lower in the 1970s than for the next decade or two. At the other extreme, there has 
been virtually no change in moving rate for those aged between 25 and 39. In between 
come those in their 40s and the under-20s, with relatively modest reductions in rate 
compared to those aged 50 and over.  
Figure 2. Proportion of all people with a different address at the end of the decade 
from the start, by age group (Source: calculated from ONS-LS. Crown copyright) 
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Meanwhile, in relation to longer-distance address changing, it is occupational status, 
along with age, that helps to account for the only very limited reduction in the overall 
rate between the 1970s and the 2000s. As Figure 3 shows, across the four decades 
there is a broad contrast in the trend in 50km+ moving rate between the three more 
highly skilled social/skill groups and the three lower ones. The former have each seen 
a progressive decline in rate, apart from slight uplift for the professional group (Social 
Class I) between the 1970s and 1980s and an even slighter one for the skilled non-
manual group (Social Class IIIN) in the last decade. By contrast, there is no sign of a 
decline in the rate for the three less skilled groups, but instead a rather flat trajectory 
for skilled manual workers (Social Class IIIM) and an increase in rate for the partly 
skilled and unskilled groups (Social Classes IV and V) after 1991. The result is a 
considerable convergence in the 50km+ migration rate across these six main groups, 
with occupational status becoming less of a discriminator by the 2000s.  
Figure 3. Proportion of all people with an address at the end of the decade at least 
50km away from that at the start, by Social Class (Source: calculated from ONS-LS. 
Crown copyright) 
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Modelling the separate role of each personal characteristic 
Up to this point, the findings on address changing have been based on separate 
analyses of each type of person. As a result, there has been speculation that the 
difference in rate between such categories has not been driven entirely by that 
characteristic but also by variations in their composition of other attributes that are 
related to address changing, most notably age and – for longer-distance migration – 
by social/skill status. This final section of the paper uses binary logistic regression to 
reveal how much each variable affects the odds of people making a 10-year address 
change over a particular distance when allowance is made for the effect of all the 
other variables included in the model.  
For this stage of the study, the population at risk is restricted to people aged 15-74 at 
the start of the decade, because outside this span people were not classified in terms of 
economic position, educational qualification and occupational grouping consistently 
across the censuses. This restriction also helps to side-step the ‘student issue’, in that 
the 2001-2011 cohort will include very few people who were still students in 2011 
(when aged 25-84). As an additional precaution, any students aged 15 or over in 2001 
are also excluded, so as to remove the ‘going-down’ moves of those who were at 
university then, thereby putting this period’s address changing on the same basis as 
for the 1970s. In terms of modelling procedure, one value of each characteristic is 
excluded from the regressions and acts as the reference category (with value of 1.000) 
against which the parameters assigned to the remaining categories are benchmarked. 
By comparing the results for the 2000s with those for the 1970s, one can see how each 
category has altered over time in its role with respect to the other values of that 
characteristic. Also, by examining the change in the range of the parameters for each 
characteristic, one can then detect whether or not each has become a more salient 
factor in the intensity of internal migration of England and Wales. 
The results of this modelling are shown in Table 3, both for all distances of 10-year 
address changing (which are dominated by moves of less than 10km as seen above in 
Figure 1) and for just the longest-distance ones of 50km and over (which comprise 
less than one-fifth of all moves even in 2001-2011 after the decades of reducing short-
distance moving).  
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Table 3.Modelling of the propensity to be living at a different address at the end of the 
decade from that at the start, by distance of move 
Characteristic All distances 50km and over 
1971-1981 2001-2011 Shift 1971-1981 2001-2011 Shift 
Female 
Male 0.965** 1.020* +0.055 0.990 1.060*** +0.070 
15-24 
25-34 0.342*** 0.474*** +0.133 0.752*** 0.787*** +0.036 
35-44 0.143*** 0.200*** +0.057 0.447*** 0.512*** +0.065 
45-54 0.107*** 0.119*** +0.012 0.406*** 0.487*** +0.082 
55-64 0.111*** 0.104*** -0.007 0.520*** 0.520*** +0.000 
65-74 0.110*** 0.094*** -0.016 0.416*** 0.415*** -0.001 
Non UK Born 
UK-Born 0.726*** 1.069*** +0.343 1.004 1.159*** +0.155 
Single 
Married 0.847*** 0.787*** -0.060 1.037*** 0.888*** -0.148 
Widowed 1.092*** 1.010 -0.082 0.921 0.926 +0.005 
Divorced 1.615*** 1.258*** -0.357 1.308*** 1.076* -0.232 
Owner Occupier 
Social Renter 1.087*** 0.992 -0.095 0.501*** 0.748*** +0.247 
Private Renter 2.462*** 3.765*** +1.303 1.330*** 2.261*** +0.931 
Employed Full-time 
Employed Part-time 0.768*** 0.772*** +0.004 0.850*** 0.799*** -0.051 
Self-employed 1.091*** 1.038* -0.053 0.709*** 0.892*** +0.183 
Unemployed 1.162*** 0.903*** -0.259 1.376*** 1.105* -0.271 
Sick 0.998 0.970 -0.028 0.680*** 0.922* +0.241 
Retired 0.868*** 0.799*** -0.070 0.950 0.905* -0.045 
Other Inactive 0.854*** 0.835*** -0.019 1.093 1.046 -0.046 
No degree 
Degree 1.257*** 1.142*** -0.115 1.719*** 1.601*** -0.118 
Professional 
Intermediate 1.140*** 1.060** -0.081 1.041 0.889*** -0.152 
Skilled Non-Manual 1.058* 0.958 -0.100 0.874*** 0.764*** -0.110 
Skilled Manual 0.814*** 0.851*** +0.037 0.432*** 0.554*** +0.121 
Partly Skilled 0.875*** 0.808*** -0.067 0.508*** 0.565*** +0.057 
Unskilled 0.917** 0.819*** -0.098 0.375*** 0.486*** +0.111 
Armed Forces 3.739*** 2.294*** -1.445 6.252*** 5.719*** -0.533 
Unclassified 0.948 0.828*** -0.120 0.632*** 0.505*** -0.127 
Constant 7.508*** 3.592*** 0.231*** 0.139*** 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.227 0.231 0.087 0.071 
-2 Log Likelihood 331782 347213 150107 145777 
Number of cases 276,940 297,801 276,940 297,801 
Note: Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05. Table shows the odds of a 10-year address 
change of the specified distance compared to the reference case (1.000) for each variable (shown in 
italics), and the shift in coefficient between the two periods. The populations at risk are people aged 15-
74 at the start of the decade and not students then.  
Source: calculated from ONS-LS. Crown copyright.  
The first data column of Table 3 reveals the independent effect of each variable on the 
odds of a person changing address over any distance between 1971 and 1981 while 
allowing for the effect of all the other variables shown. In particular, it confirms the 
negative relationship between address changing and age, with the next older group of 
25-34s having odds barely one-third of those of the 15-24 group (which forms the 
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reference category) and the four oldest age groups displaying odds that are at least 
85% lower. Indeed, this is an even steeper gradient across age that the one shown for 
the relevant age groups in Figure 2 that did not allow for the effect of the other 
variables, all the more impressive for its omission of students.  
Also clear from this column of Table 3 is that, even allowing for age and the other 
characteristics, the private rented sector retains its status as the housing tenure with 
the highest turnover, with a rate nearly two and a half times that of owner occupation, 
again a much bigger differential than suggested by the 72%/50% contrast in Table A1. 
The same is the case for armed forces personnel, for whom the odds are almost four 
times those of professional workers once other characteristics are taken into account. 
The three lowest-status worker groups all display lower odds than the three highest 
ones, paralleling the broad contrast in rates shown in Figure 3. Those with degrees 
have higher odds than those without, and those born outside the UK than natives, both 
as for the rates shown in Table A1. For economic position, the ranking across values 
for odds is almost identical to that for rates, with the unemployed being the most 
likely to move. With marital status, however, now that age and other characteristics 
are allowed for, both widowed people and especially divorcees have higher odds of 
moving than singles. Also, the relative position of the genders has flipped over in 
favour of females, though the difference is significant only at the 1% level.   
Three decades on (second data column of Table 3), virtually all these broad patterns 
are still evident, the exceptions being that now males and the UK-born are somewhat 
more mobile than females and immigrants respectively and the unemployed are now 
less mobile than their reference category of full-time employees. Additionally, 
however, there are a number of changes in degree with respect to the benchmarks, as 
can be most easily read from the third data column. In particular, starting the decade 
as a private renter now confers almost four times the odds of a 10-year address change 
compared with being an owner occupier, while the odds for a member of the armed 
forces compared to a professional worker have dropped back substantially. As regards 
the other characteristics, in the 2000s there is now a clear progression of odds 
reducing with increasing age, with those aged 55 and over being even more different 
from the 15-24s than in the 1970s but the 25-54s seeing some convergence towards 
them. Even allowing for age, retirees have seen their odds of moving home drop 
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further away from their reference category. In terms of occupation, the reference 
category of professionals has increased its moving odds relative to all the other groups 
apart from skilled manual workers, as also has being single compared to the other 
three marital-status categories. Possessing a degree or equivalent tertiary qualification 
now confers a less positive effect than three decades earlier.  
As regards longer-distance moving, there are a number of differences from the all-
distance results, which is indicative of a different pattern from shorter-distance 
moving, as seen by comparing the last three data columns of Table 3 with the first 
three:  
 For age, the odds of a 50km+ move decline much less rapidly with increasing age
in both periods, with a lift in rate at age 55-64 (becoming 65-74) that may be
associated with retirement migration, but the trend over time is similar to that for
shorter moves, namely with the middle age groups becoming less different from
the 15-24s.
 Married people were more likely to move 50km or more than singles in the 1970s,
unlike for shorter-distance moving, with marital status becoming a less powerful
discriminator by the 2000s.
 In terms of economic position, part-time employees have become significantly
less mobile compared with full-time ones, widening the gap, but the overall
pattern here is towards convergence on the reference category, again suggesting a
less powerful role in determining the odds of moving.
 For occupational group, the main change is that by the 2000s there is a more
regular reduction in odds with lower status, most notably produced by the
Intermediate group changing to significantly lower odds than the reference
category, but here too the range across the six main ‘social classes’ has narrowed.
 Having a degree is a more important driver of long-distance than is the case for
shorter-distance moving, but its discriminatory power has waned somewhat over
time.
 Social renters have seen their odds of a long-distance move rise to be more like
owner occupiers, though private renters have become even more mobile relative to
the latter.
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 Relative to immigrants, the UK-born were the more mobile over long distance,
unlike over shorter distances, with their odds of making a long-distance move
rising over time.
 Males were significantly more likely than females to have moved a long distance
in the 2000s, whereas there was no significant difference in the 1970s, this change
closely paralleling the pattern for shorter-distance moving.
Overall, this process of allowing for the effects of the other characteristics (together 
with using a more restricted population) does not greatly alter the rates-based findings 
of the previous section. For both the 1970s and the 2000s and over short and long 
distance, age even enhances its role as a key factor behind address-changing 
differentials, as also does renting privately, having a degree and being a member of 
the armed forces. One exception is that, once that allowance is made, it is females that 
are found to have been the more migratory in the 1970s, but this was no longer the 
case by the 2000s. Other significant changes between the 1970s and the 2000s are 
found in both rates and odds results, including the switch of the UK-born from being 
less to more migratory than immigrants, private renters becoming notably more 
migratory over time and the unemployed and the armed forces becoming considerably 
less so. 
What the regression results in Table 3 also confirm is the marked difference in the 
trend over time between shorter- and longer-distance address changing. The all-
distance model, in which address changes of less than 10km predominate, provides a 
much closer fit to the data, with a Nagelkerke R Square of 0.227 for 1971-1981 
compared to one of just 0.087 for the model of the odds of moving 50km and over. 
Moreover, whereas the level of explanation for the former rises somewhat to 0.231 in 
2001-2011 for the former, the fit falls a little for the long-distance moves. These 
contrasts reflect the fact that the spread of the coefficients for each characteristic 
around the reference case in 1971-1981 was generally wider for the all-distance model 
(though not for occupational status) and in some cases was even widen in 2001-2011, 
whereas a degree of convergence on the reference case is found for 50km+ model.  
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Finally, however, there is one key similarity between the two models, though more 
one of direction than degree. In both cases the constant is lower in 2001-2011 than in 
1971-1981, indicating that the underlying rate of 10-year address changing has 
declined between the two periods for both shorter- and longer-distance moving. But 
the drop is considerably more marked for the shorter-distance moving that dominates 
the all-distance model. Indeed, the contrast with the smaller decline for long-distance 
moving would no doubt have been greater if the modelling had been able to include 
students, because while part of the rise in 50km+ moving rate for the age groups 5-24 
(becoming 15-34) shown in Table A1 will have been due to statistical artefact owing 
to the 2001-2011 data including moves to and from university unlike for 1971-1981, a 
part of that rise is likely to be real, in that increases in higher-education participation 
since the 1970s mean that the number of school-leavers going away to university was 
very much higher in the 2000s.  
Summary and concluding comments 
This study of long-term trends in the intensity of address changing in England and 
Wales was prompted partly by the now well-documented phenomenon of migration 
decline in the USA (see Cooke, 2011, 2013) but also by Champion and Shuttleworth’s 
(2015) finding that, according to migration data derived from health service records, 
there has been no substantial fall in overall migration rates there since the start of 
continuous recording in 1971, merely the ups and downs associated with the booms 
and busts of the business cycle. This paper has reported the results of interrogating an 
alternative data source, namely the ONS-LS with its variable on 10-year migration 
that helps to even out short-term cyclical effects. According to this analysis, address 
changing in England and Wales has declined markedly in recent decades, with the 10-
year rate reducing from 55 per cent for 1971-1981 to barely 45 per cent changing it 
between 2001 and 2011, representing a percentage decrease of some 18 per cent.  
Yet these two sets of headline results for England and Wales are not as incompatible 
with each other as it would seem at first glance. This is principally because the data 
used in the present study covers all distances of address changing whereas the 
NHSCR data set used by Champion and Shuttleworth (2015) records only moves 
between quite large areas and is thus dominated by longer-distance moving. The 
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distance breakdown available in the ONS-LS confirms that over the past four decades 
the overall propensity of people to move longer distances has not declined by nearly 
as much in England and Wales as in the USA. The really big changes have been 
restricted to moves of less than 10km, for which the rate dropped by a quarter 
between the 1970s and the 2000s according to the ONS-LS data, these being the 
moves that very largely go unrecorded in the NHSCR. Moreover, despite the 
differences between the two data sets, there is also some consistency in that they both 
show change in migratory behaviour of older people as being a significant element in 
the lowering of rates over this period.  
At the same time, the present study has been able to probe further than the previous 
one by virtue of the ONS-LS containing information on a much wider range of 
personal characteristics than just the age and gender of the NHSCR. For one thing, it 
is now clear that the decline in overall migration rate is a widespread phenomenon, 
involving not just older people but shared by virtually all the population subgroups 
tracked in this study, albeit to varying extents but with only a couple of exceptions, 
notably those living in the private rented sector. The latter has also been shown to be 
key to the relative resilience of longer-distance moving, no doubt associated in part 
with the rising numbers going into higher education. Less expected in terms of the 
propensity of people to move 50km or more over a decade, however, is the steep rise 
registered by the less skilled sections of the labour force at the same time as the rate 
for higher-status occupations has fallen by around the same amount in relative terms. 
This apparent convergence of long-distance moving rates across the social scale 
merits further investigation, though one can speculate that the growth of white-collar 
work at the expense of blue-collar – which in itself is shifting population composition 
towards the traditionally more mobile groups – is moving the less migratory types of 
people and work up the official social-class scale.  
In sum, the two principal findings of the long-term decline in short-distance moving 
and the relative resilience of longer-distance migration merit further attention. The fall 
in local residential mobility since the 1970s is so marked that it is surprising that the 
present study represents the first systematic attempt to document it. Perhaps, as 
occurred previously in the USA, the emphasis given to the notions of ever-increasing 
mobility has distracted attention from this development or, at best, has tempted 
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commentators to treat it as a temporary phenomenon related to economic recession. 
Given that the latter seems to be far from the case, the challenge now is to investigate 
this trend more thoroughly in order to identify the factors behind it and provide a basis 
of understanding that can help to anticipate whether the trend will continue. This is 
vital because this trend is one that has all manner of implications for individuals, 
communities and national well-being. As regards there being evidence of only a small 
reduction in the propensity to migrate over longer distances, the task is somewhat 
different, with the emphasis initially needing to be put on the verification of this 
finding and then, if confirmed, proceeding to investigate the reasons behind the 
contrast with US experience.   
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Table A1. Change between 1971-1981 and 2001-2011 in the proportion of all people with a different 
address at the end of the decade from that at the start, by characteristic and distance of move  
Age group All distances Under 10km 50km and over 
1971-
1981 
2001-
2011 
% 
change 
1971-
1981 
2001-
2011 
% 
change 
1971-
1981 
2001-
2011 
% 
change 
All people 55.0 45.3 -17.7 36.5 27.5 -24.5 9.5 9.3 -2.6 
Age 
0-4 62.3 52.8 -15.2 42.3 37.8 -10.8 10.4 7.3 -29.9 
5-9 51.1 47.3 -7.4 35.6 29.7 -16.7 8.4 10.5 24.9 
10-14 68.0 60.2 -11.4 44.7 31.4 -29.8 12.2 18.6 52.3 
15-19 87.3 74.9 -14.2 53.7 42.3 -21.1 16.4 18.4 12.0 
20-24 84.3 81.4 -3.5 51.4 45.2 -12.0 15.3 19.4 27.0 
25-29 70.3 71.8 2.2 43.3 43.6 0.7 13.1 12.6 -3.9 
30-34 57.3 56.8 -0.8 38.2 36.4 -4.7 9.6 9.3 -3.5 
35-39 45.8 44.4 -3.1 31.5 29.0 -7.8 7.5 7.0 -6.5 
40-44 39.2 35.6 -9.2 27.8 23.1 -16.9 6.0 5.6 -5.6 
45-49 36.0 29.4 -18.3 26.0 18.1 -30.2 5.2 5.5 4.5 
50-54 36.3 27.0 -25.7 25.3 15.6 -38.4 6.2 6.0 -3.9 
55-59 37.5 25.1 -33.0 25.7 14.5 -43.7 7.1 6.0 -15.5 
60-64 37.6 22.6 -40.0 25.8 13.6 -47.2 7.2 5.0 -29.6 
65-69 36.5 20.2 -44.6 26.7 12.4 -53.6 5.6 4.2 -25.3 
70-74 37.1 21.0 -43.5 26.6 13.1 -50.7 5.7 4.2 -27.5 
75-79 40.8 25.4 -37.8 28.3 16.4 -42.0 6.2 5.0 -19.5 
80-84 46.1 32.4 -29.6 33.7 20.5 -39.3 6.8 5.9 -13.7 
85+ 52.6 44.9 -14.7 34.4 29.6 -14.0 11.0 7.5 -31.7 
Gender 
Male 55.3 45.4 -17.9 36.6 27.2 -25.8 9.6 9.5 -1.0 
Female 54.7 45.2 -17.4 36.3 27.8 -23.4 9.5 9.1 -4.1 
Birth country 
UK 54.6 45.6 -16.6 36.2 27.7 -23.6 9.5 9.4 -1.0 
Non UK 61.2 42.0 -31.4 41.0 26.1 -36.5 11.0 8.5 -22.6 
Marital status 
Single 65.6 60.2 -8.2 42.7 35.7 -16.3 11.6 13.3 15.3 
Married 47.1 32.6 -30.7 31.6 20.5 -35.3 8.2 6.1 -25.4 
Widowed 42.2 27.5 -34.7 31.6 17.9 -43.2 5.7 4.8 -15.1 
Divorced 63.1 43.5 -31.1 43.2 27.6 -36.0 9.7 7.0 -27.4 
Housing tenure 
Owner occupied 50.3 41.2 -18.2 30.6 24.8 -18.9 10.6 8.4 -21.1 
Social renting 53.3 45.5 -14.7 41.6 33.3 -20.0 4.9 5.4 9.4 
Private renting 71.5 76.4 6.8 45.6 41.7 -8.6 13.7 20.0 46.2 
Economic position 
Employed fulltime 56.4 48.8 -13.6 37.1 29.2 -21.3 9.4 8.9 -4.6 
Employed parttime 42.1 35.9 -14.7 29.5 24.7 -16.3 6.9 5.4 -21.3 
Self employed 52.6 40.0 -23.9 35.6 25.1 -29.4 7.2 6.6 -8.7 
Unemployed 62.6 51.8 -17.3 42.4 34.0 -19.7 10.4 8.6 -17.4 
Student 87.6 77.3 -11.8 34.2 33.6 -1.8 33.0 28.4 -13.9 
Sick 48.0 34.9 -27.4 35.3 23.9 -32.3 4.9 5.0 2.1 
Retired 37.5 20.7 -44.7 26.7 12.5 -53.0 6.1 4.6 -24.8 
Other inactive 47.7 41.6 -12.8 32.3 28.4 -11.9 8.4 6.8 -19.0 
Social class 
Professional 58.2 44.6 -23.4 28.0 21.5 -23.0 16.6 12.7 -23.6 
Intermediate 55.2 44.7 -19.1 30.0 24.6 -17.9 13.9 9.9 -28.8 
Skilled non-manual 58.7 44.8 -23.7 35.2 26.9 -23.6 11.1 8.9 -19.8 
Skilled manual 50.6 39.4 -22.0 38.1 26.9 -29.4 5.1 5.5 7.2 
Partly skilled 49.6 41.8 -15.7 37.2 27.6 -25.7 5.7 7.3 29.2 
Unskilled 48.6 36.1 -25.8 40.1 25.7 -35.9 3.8 4.9 27.1 
Armed forces 88.2 74.6 -15.4 17.3 18.0 3.7 60.1 44.4 -26.2 
Other/unclassified 50.6 49.8 -1.4 32.4 30.5 -5.7 10.1 11.1 9.4 
Top qualification 
Degree etc 58.5 48.0 -18.1 27.6 24.2 -12.3 19.0 12.6 -33.6 
Below 3rd level 51.3 41.6 -19.0 34.7 26.4 -23.9 8.2 7.4 -10.4 
Source: calculated from ONS-LS. Crown copyright. 
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